Anorexia nervosa and first-person perspective: Altruism, family system and body experience by Englebert, Jérôme et al.
E-Mail karger@karger.com
 Original Paper 
 Psychopathology 
 DOI: 10.1159/000485629 
 Anorexia Nervosa and First-Person 
Perspective: Altruism, Family System, 
and Body Experience  
 Jérôme Englebert a, b    Valérie Follet a    Caroline Valentiny a  
 a  University of Liège,  Liège , Belgium;  b  Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV), University of Lausanne, 
 Lausanne , Switzerland
 
 Introduction 
 The distinction between first-person and third-person 
perspectives constitutes a recent and decisive contribu-
tion of phenomenological philosophy to psychopatholo-
gy  [1, 2] . Third-person perspective, which is used in the 
latest versions of the DSM or in evidence-based medicine, 
involves the attribution, from an external position, of 
clinical signs that have little to do with the perception ex-
pressed by the patient. The classic examples of these signs 
are schizophrenic delusion and hallucination. Those 
symptoms underline the difficulties experienced by the 
subject to identify himself as affected by the disorder 
(anosognosia). This point is considered a priority thera-
peutic target by dominant models. 
 Consideration of first-person perspective is the oppo-
site process, focusing attention on subjective experience 
expressed by the patient. In schizophrenia again, what pa-
tients verbalize is “loss of natural self-evidence,” “psycho-
pathology of common sense,” or “diminished sense of 
self”  [2–5] . Those clinical signs, as they reveal the experi-
ence of the self, become the structuring psychopatholog-
ical element and highlight a schizophrenic way of being-
in-the-world.
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 Abstract 
 Based on the case study of Jeanne, the objective of this ar-
ticle is to study patterns of specific subjectivity in anorexic 
subjects. We seek to identify, in a first-person perspective, 
the core vulnerability features of anorexic existence, beyond 
the dimension of food alone. The identification of a psycho-
pathological structure results in a better understanding of 
Jeanne’s clinical situation and helps formulate psychothera-
peutic and prophylactic recommendations. We suggest that 
so-called “denial” is a psychological mechanism that should 
be reconsidered. Denial is not a mechanism pertaining to 
anorexic subjects alone, but is also a process encountered 
both in the patient’s family and in the therapeutic environ-
ment. Anorexic denial is based on anosognosia and the re-
fusal to see one’s own thinness, while other people’s denial 
consists in a widespread inability to perceive the altruism 
and intersubjective problematic on which the existence of 
an anorexic subject fundamentally depends. 
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 This paper aims to bring about this passage towards 
first-person perspective in an attempt to better under-
stand the subjects affected by anorexia nervosa. We start 
from the hypothesis of Demaret  [6] , which suggests, in a 
somewhat disconcerting way, to not focus primarily on 
the purely medical angle related to weight loss and refus-
al to eat. This model uncovers the adaptive components 
of the disorder and resonates with the words of anorexic 
patients, who often do not perceive their thinness due to 
the well-known mechanism of denial. In first-person per-
spective – if we hand it over to the subject – anorexic 
anosognosia and the morbid tendency to deprive oneself 
of food at the risk of threatening one’s life reveal a need 
(sometimes excessive) to take care of others, to feed them, 
but also excessive self-consciousness. The emotional and 
body investment in relationships is often seen as unsatis-
fying, even as being the driving force of uneasiness. 
 Actually, there are two tendencies which reinforce 
each other. On the one hand, anorexic behaviour could 
be the legacy of altruistic behaviour – probably unin-
tentional or at least not stemming from a conscious in-
tent – dating back to our ancestors and still observable in 
the animal reign – among social animals whose young 
females deprive themselves of food while actively taking 
part in the search for food for other members of the 
group (with a particular interest in the youngest ones). 
This behaviour, thanks to its outstandingly adaptive as-
pect for survival of groups, would have remained through 
evolution and ended up in our time among people with 
a particular interest in others. On the other hand, as it 
appears in anorexic people’s own words, they attach fun-
damental importance to others’ glaze, to what this glaze 
can imply in the definition of their own identity, in their 
feeling of legitimacy. These two tendencies have in com-
mon the central place held by relationships to others – 
intersubjectivity – in psychological as well as behavioural 
functioning. Although it is not surprising that these two 
tendencies are expressed within the same psychopatho-
logical structure, we note a centrifugal motion – reveal-
ing the altruistic leaning – and a centripetal one – point-
ing out a disposition to autoconservation through others’ 
point of view. The complex relationship between the an-
orexic subject and others probably lies in this double po-
larity. 
 This questioning of the omniscient vision of the med-
ical leads to criticism of the domination power that comes 
with third-person perspective. It turns out to be a relevant 
psychotherapeutic tool. It desacralizes the anosognosia 
issue, questions the denial (this mechanism also becomes 
that of the family and friends of the anorexic person, who 
 are not able to perceive  the altruistic overinvestment), and 
opens the door to an intersubjective, co-constructed per-
spective. We propose, through this paper, to take interest 
in anorexic subjectivity starting from the analysis of the 
clinical case of a young female patient. 
 Clinical Case 
 Jeanne is 24 years of age and has been suffering from anorexia 
for 3 years. Her clinical picture is quite classic: weight loss, bulimia 
phases with vomiting, amenorrhea, nonexistent sex life and spe-
cific phobias, paradoxical hyperactivity (college student, high-lev-
el violinist, going scuba diving, and baby-sitting), and paradoxical 
interest in food (excellent cook, loves feeding other members of 
her family, and contributes to a blog dedicated to cooking). She 
confesses being now able to recognize her thinness in the mirror 
(denial was part of the clinical picture during her first months of 
illness). Jeanne explains that the way other people look at her is 
quite trying. She mentions a sense of shame based on the impos-
sibility to know what others think about her and what exactly they 
see in her. 
 Jeanne recalls an emblematic episode of her existence before 
the disorder: “I’m in the kitchen, I’ve just finished cooking. My 
brother wants to serve the meal and I’ve got the feeling he is trying 
to take over the meal I’ve cooked.”
 Jeanne clarifies that she knows, however, that this feeling of 
usurpation is wrong, but she says she cannot stop thinking about 
it. She explains afterwards that she feels an awkwardness around 
the table (which is composed of her brother, her father, and her 
mother): “I’m still standing and keep serving the meal even though 
the plates are all abundantly filled. But I can’t do anything else. 
Each of them, after having started to eat, pretend they don’t see 
my inability to stop, tell me to sit and eat with them. I fake not 
hearing them, until my father, exasperated by an attitude which 
occurs at almost every meal, gets angry. I can’t stand it and live 
this scene as a non-recognition of all I’ve done, of all the energy 
I’ve spent preparing the meal, I experience it as a non-recognition 
of who I am.”
 This story is emblematic of the anorexic impasse and failure to 
be understood. A network of crossed interpretations takes place 
between a young woman who does not feel  understood and  recog-
nized in the eyes of her relatives, who themselves seem caught in 
an apparent  denial of the disorder and a systematic refusal to evoke 
it. We can also observe that her relatives do not feel  understood by 
the young woman and that the family also expresses a  denial mech-
anism with regard to Jeanne’s food altruism and concern about her 
family. 
 Altruism as Adaptive Dimension 
 Demaret  [6, 7] proposes to identify group behaviour 
as one of the structuring elements of anorexic experience, 
especially altruistic conducts. He suggests not focusing as 






















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

























loss. This symptom is the most visible and worrying be-
cause refusal to eat, with no organic cause, may lead the 
subject to a very important state of slimming and even, in 
the most extreme cases, to death. However, if we go back 
to the difference between first-person and third-person 
perspectives, the symptom of refusing to eat, when we 
listen to anorexic patients – in this case Jeanne – is often 
minimized or refuted (that is the denial mechanism pro-
posed by psychoanalysis, or the anosognosia proposed by 
cognitive psychology).
 Demaret precisely considers it essential to take interest 
in other signs, often seen as secondary but formally asso-
ciated with the anorexic picture and often brought up by 
patients. He notes the following: the usual absence of de-
pression and negation of the skinny state, anosognosia, 
preservation of an important physical and mental activi-
ty, amenorrhea (which can be the consequence of under-
nutrition but occurs sometimes before that), female pre-
dominance of this disorder, episodes of bulimia, vomit-
ing, and food altruism. 
 The paradox, often observed but rarely explained, of 
the deep interest in food is particularly interesting: an-
orexic patients usually have great knowledge of nutrition 
science, seek to feed others, and cook for their friends and 
relatives (that they sometimes seem to “force-feed”), steal 
food and conceal it in hiding places, often seem obsessed 
with food and never stop talking about it, and may pre-
sent paradoxical phases of overeating (bulimia). A second 
paradoxical dimension of the disorder is typical hyperac-
tivity. Those young girls whose appearance is weak and 
fragile often take upon themselves an impressive and per-
manent physical and intellectual activity. 
 They also seem particularly resistant to infectious dis-
eases, as if they were immune  [6] – except when the state 
of slimming becomes too severe and causes serious meta-
bolic troubles. When the condition does not get blown 
out of proportion, we observe that anorexic people pos-
sess astonishing adaptive capacity to their environment 1 .
 A behaviour of particular interest for Demaret is food 
altruism, which he considers the most fundamental com-
ponent of the syndrome. To understand the functional 
dimension of this tendency to feed others, we must keep 
in mind that the adaptive value of behaviours is not sole-
ly directed at the individual, but extends to the group to 
which he or she is related. An individual who ingests very 
little food, remains active and resistant while presenting 
an “obsession” for food – which facilitates its search – and 
wishes to feed other members of the group presents a con-
siderable advantage for one’s belonging group. This be-
haviour particularly benefits the children of the group, 
who require a great deal of attention and depend on oth-
ers to feed themselves. Vomiting or regurgitating are, by 
the way, very widespread feeding modes in the animal 
world and in many human societies  [6] . This taking care 
of children leads to a new paradoxical dimension of an-
orexia. While they are biologically unable to procreate 
(amenorrhea) and are often phobic to the idea, anorexic 
people present a great interest in children. They are or 
would like to be babysitters, in charge of youth clubs, 
childcare workers, paediatric nurses, speech therapists, 
educators, teachers, etc. 
 All of these elements allow us to generalize the altru-
ism notion, which exceeds the food sphere. However, we 
can clarify that, in the line of psychoanalytic interpreta-
tion, understanding of prosocial anorexic behaviour has 
to be interpreted as an essential psychodynamic defence 
mechanism  [14–16] . Altruistic care, sometimes result-
ing in force feeding, can “hide” an unconscious aggres-
sive relationship to other. Feeding others is also control-
ling them in a very efficient way, and making them de-
pendent on oneself. It is therefore interesting to keep in 
mind that this phenomenologically observed paradoxi-
cal altruistic behaviour (about feeding, but also general-
ized) can point out a more ambiguous relationship to 
others, made of hetero-control, anger, and even aggres-
siveness  [14, 15] . Besides, not feeding oneself (or very 
little) suggests another form of intersubjective but also 
subjective command and makes it impossible for others 
to feed him or her (anorexic patients often hate receiving 
food or eating in anybody’s presence). Anorexic behav-
iour makes it impossible for another person to be in a 
position of command like the anorexic person. Another 
 1   We wish to stress in this footnote the notable literature of evolutionary 
psychiatry which grants an important place to anorexia and eating disorders. 
Refusing to eat, which seems to go against an adaptive logic, may be recon-
textualized in extreme conditions like famine  [8–10] . The anorexic person 
manages to maintain vitality and energy in his/her search for new resources 
despite the little nutritional intake. Guisinger  [11] observes that the anorexic 
person suffers a lesser weakening in the face of food deprivation and there-
fore is able to keep functioning in an adapted way in the case of undernutri-
tion. The status of sexuality and reproductive potential is also evoked. The 
anorexic person’s reproductive potential may be suppressed via amenorrhea 
when conditions are bad  [9, 12] , or else this potential may be suppressed by a 
dominant female who attempts to eliminate a rival from the “breeding race” 
by pushing female teenagers to starve themselves, thus leading to amenor-
rhea  [8, 13] . Stevens and Price  [10] also approach the disorder from the “so-
cial ranking theory” point of view, proposing to consider eating disorders as 
a sort of remainder of class struggle. According to times and societies, either 
thinness or excess weight is seen as a sign of high social status. In our socie-
ties where resources are relatively abundant and where less privileged per-
sons have access to food high in fats and sugars, thinness is valued and un-






















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

























way of developing this notion of altruism – of which we 
have already pointed out the centrifugal-altruism/cen-
tripetal-consideration double polarity – is to understand 
it from the angle of gift and counter-gift developed in the 
anthropology of Mauss  [17] . According to the anthro-
pologist, the structure of social bond relies on a give-
receive-render principle. It seems interesting thinking 
that the anorexic person lives this dimension of social 
bond in a distended, unstable way, seeking by turns to 
overinvest gift or counter-gift without reaching a recip-
rocal relationship which could allow a balanced and sta-
ble intersubjectivity.
 At the same time as the identification of these behav-
iours, Demaret  [6] resorts to a clarifying analogy with a 
corresponding animal mode. He finds, in the reports of 
Goodall  [18] about the behaviour of female chimpanzees 
when they take interest in their mother’s or sister’s new-
born, troubling similarities. They assume the role of edu-
cators and propose a form of prosocial behaviour learn-
ing. Those female primates have no offspring of their own 
and therefore raise a youth who is not theirs but is part of 
their close environment, which is not the case of Jeanne, 
but many anorexia cases are triggered among young 
adults whose parents welcome a new child. An analogical 
analysis allows us to assume a junction between this 
“helpers at the nest” animal behaviour and the anorexic 
behaviour; the analogy with the animal world helps us to 
understand the characteristic relationship between an-
orexic people and their close family system in a different 
light. 
 A link between ethology and phenomenology may 
seem, at first, simple to establish. Indeed, in both ap-
proaches, it is about meeting a phenomenon while put-
ting aside, insofar as possible, one’s theoretical a priori 
interpretations, in order to be able to get surprised and to 
not orientate the way we look at this phenomenon. How-
ever, if we linger over the first-person perspective as a 
phenomenological approach to a situation, it becomes 
more difficult to understand at once the link with ethol-
ogy. Indeed, because animals do not speak, it is impossi-
ble to gather their opinion about their situation or feel-
ings, and observations may, at first glance, seem more 
specific of a third-person perspective. Nonetheless, a 
slight difference stands in the adopted point of view with 
respect to the animal’s world ( Umwelt )  [19] . If we place 
ourselves in an understanding process of the situation as 
it is lived by the animal, considering the meaning this 
world can have for him rather than transmitting our own 
interpretations and references, we get closer to first- than 
third-person perspective.
 Anorexic Psychopathology and Body Experience 
 Phenomenological analysis in psychopathology focus-
es on understanding individual subjectivity and, there-
fore, falls within a first-person perspective. Many works 
of this tradition have come to link anorexic psychopa-
thology with complex alterity and “intercorporeity” pro-
cesses  [20–28] . According to a traditional proposition of 
phenomenology, we can distinguish two types of body 
experience.  Leib is the body as experienced, that is, direct 
and intuitive body experience lived from the inside and 
in first-person by the subject. It corresponds to what the 
subject is for himself, as a spatiotemporal being, embod-
ied in the world.  Körper , or body as an object, is the ex-
plicitly perceived body, seen from the outside, in third-
person.  Leib is emotional and evokes transcendence of 
the self, whereas  Körper is devitalized. One is moved by 
intentionality and subjectivity, the other comes down to 
an objective mechanism.  Körper is the body which can be 
manipulated, for example, the one handled by a surgeon 
when he operates or the one studied by the anatomist, 
while  Leib is the body which manipulates the world, the 
one the phenomenologist addresses as well as the clini-
cian. In the practice of psychiatry or in many cognitive 
psychology perspectives, practitioners deal with  Körper 
with regard to medication or cognitive function remedia-
tion practices. 
 This first contribution is useful to our understanding 
of anorexic body experience because it demonstrates that 
it is possible to evoke body existence beyond the simple 
materiality of this body, or beyond its simple representa-
tion  [21, 28] , and consequently beyond its state of slim-
ness. An anorexic-lived body cannot be reduced to the 
marks of the disease. The body experience of the anorex-
ic person transcends the extreme thinness of his/her 
arms. His/her body is moved by intentionality, in other 
words by the tendency of the consciousness to go beyond 
itself and to burst into the world. However, as Bowden 
 [20] and Gaete and Fuchs  [28] underline it, the expression 
of the anorexic-lived body is obviously troubled. The an-
orexic person suffers from disordered bodily experience 
in the sense of being cut off from a range of sensations. 
She does not inhabit her body in an evident way and is 
only imperfectly “in” it.
 In order to highlight this pathological relationship 
with bodily experience, Bowden  [20] discusses the body 
as subject/objet, based on the works of Merleau-Ponty 
 [29] . The latter studies the fact that the body is endowed 
with a double sensation which consists in being able to 






















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

























mension). Merleau-Ponty  [29] exemplifies this with 
touching one’s right hand with one’s left hand: “The first 
is an intersecting of bones, muscles, and flesh compressed 
into a point of space; the second shoots across space to 
reveal the external object in its place” [ 29,  p. 94]. But the 
philosopher clarifies there are  mixed situations, revealing 
 double sensations: “So when I press my two hands togeth-
er, it is not a question of two sensations that I could feel 
together, as when we perceive two objects juxtaposed, but 
rather of an ambiguous organization where the two hands 
can alternate between the functions of ‘touching’ and 
‘touched’ ” [ 29 , p. 95].
 However, this intersecting is also a matter of contact 
with external objects, with the world. For example, when 
the pianist’s hand meets the ivory of the piano key, it 
pushes on the latter but, simultaneously, deals with an op-
posite pressure generated by the mechanism of the piano 
strings. All the power, the accuracy, and the virtuosity of 
the sonority (and the personal colouration given by the 
artist) rest on this subtle alchemy of combined touching 
and being touched. 
 The touching-touched body also has to come to terms 
with other bodies – which also respond to this dialectic. 
It brings us closer to the anorexic experience. The body, 
in the social jungle, is at the same time an active subject 
perceiving the neighbouring world and a passive object 
able to be perceived. The structural problematic of an-
orexic experience precisely takes root in the comparing 
with others’ bodies. At some point, Jeanne confided in us 
that if she were to live on a desert island, there would be 
nobody to speak about anorexia and she would never suf-
fer from it; let us remember that her abilities for finding 
food would probably allow her, more than others, to 
adapt and survive in such a situation. She also expressed 
a recurrent dream in which she was in a room with walls 
made of two-way mirrors. She knew that she was being 
observed, yet she could not see the people observing her 
(which is an unsolvable intercorporeal paradox that only 
dreams can withstand).
 Our philosophico-clinical reflection finds in the work 
of Sartre  [30] the most accomplished model regarding 
body experience and experience of others. For the latter, 
this problematic of “being seen by others,” far from being 
secondary, is a founding experience of identity process: “I 
exist for myself as a body known by the Other. […] The 
shock of the encounter with the Other is for me a revela-
tion in emptiness of the existence of my body outside as 
an in-itself for the Other” [ 30 , pp. 351–352]. Our connec-
tion to others is therefore necessary for the achievement 
of our body anchorage in the world and for our faculty to 
live inside our own body. The other is the only one able 
to accomplish a function which is fundamental to us: “to 
see ourselves as we are” [ 30 , p. 354]. Leaning on this anal-
ysis, Bowden  [20] but also Stanghellini et al.  [26, 27] sug-
gest there is, in the anorexic person, an imbalance be-
tween the perceiving-subject-body and the perceived-ob-
ject-body, the latter taking a much too decisive place. 
Under the eyes of others, the anorexic person loses his/
her capacities for body subjectivity. Intentionality escapes 
him/her and begins to depend on the watching body. In 
this context, Jeanne develops an exacerbated conscious-
ness of her every gesture. How others see and look at her 
obsess her. For example, she says that the central element 
of her relationship with her father is “his eyes, the heavi-
ness of his glaze judging me, judging who I am.”
 According to Sartre  [30] , the feeling associated with 
others’ look towards one’s own body is the emotion of 
shame. He takes the example of a man who is looking 
through a keyhole. Totally absorbed and lost in the 
world – he is only eyes, not a body being watched – he 
suddenly becomes aware of someone’s presence behind 
him. His lived-body-for-others emerges to his conscious-
ness through the discovery of another observing him. The 
spy becomes the one being spied on, and the predominant 
emotion is the shame of an individual who feels deprived 
of his role as an active subject and becomes reduced to 
being subjected to others. Bowden  [20] suggests a parallel 
between this feeling of “relational shame” and the anorex-
ic body experience. The intrusion of the other’s look is 
 permanent in the anorexic person.
 This “phenomenology of anorexia,” thanks to the con-
sideration of body experience and its relational dimen-
sion, enables us to take the focus away from the  obvious 
refusal to eat. From this point of view, in order to  under-
stand Jeanne’s problematic, we have to glimpse over this 
dominant symptom. We need to read between the lines 
of the obvious facts. This proposal runs counter to  evi-
dence-based medicine (or completes it) since the clinician 
precisely has to get “out of step” with scientific attitude. 
Merleau-Ponty  [29] reminds us that the subject is not 
“the result or the intertwining of multiple causalities that 
determine [his] body or [his] ‘psyche’; [He] cannot think 
of [himself] as a part of the world, like the simple object 
of biology, psychology, and sociology; [He] cannot en-
close [himself] within the universe of science […]. The 
entire universe of science is constructed upon the lived 
world, and if we wish to think science rigorously, to ap-
preciate precisely its sense and its scope, we must first 
awaken that experience of the world of which science is 






















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

























point of view, the ethological approach of Demaret  [6] 
meets phenomenology. Through their common meth-
odology of observation, hidden adaptive significations 
emerge from one when the other reveals states of inter-
subjectivity. 
 Conclusion: Anorexia and First-Person Perspective 
 All of these analyses suggest that the fundamental 
problematic of anorexia is an issue of intersubjectivity, 
integrating altruism (related to food or more global) and 
the process of intercorporeality. To complete this consid-
eration of first-person perspective, we need to go back to 
Jeanne’s situation and seek to characterize the emotion 
that connects our patient to her family. She confided in 
us several times of having cooked for all her family and 
feeling poorly understood, even usurped. After proposing 
to leave the food symptomatology out of our reflection, it 
seems interesting to come back to it in its social dimen-
sion. It will help us to wonder about what feeding repre-
sents beyond the strictly nutritive dimension. Indeed, 
feeding turns out to be a powerful emotional conveyor 
 [32] . Comfort foods are major emotional components 
that combine cultural elements and family features. The 
country and area where one lives possess their own spe-
cialities and each family gives unique meaning to those 
recipes. Finally, within the family, new generations will 
never achieve an identical replication of the delicacy of 
the grandmother’s  madeleine . The aesthetics of Proust 
 [31] remind us that eating is an essential biological need 
upon which  social signification gets propped up, whereby 
 common sense is passed intuitively. Jeanne, and it is prob-
ably a central characteristic of the anorexic  being-in-the-
world , overinvests this emotional flexion of the “eating 
dinner.” She is the guarantor of an emotional play of her 
family’s gastronomic traditions. Relationship to others, 
for others, takes up all the room for her. The anorexic 
person has difficulty finding his/her place on the contin-
uum between emotional need and eating need that the 
meal represents. Food may, consequently, lose all of its 
nutritional value (at least for him/her), becoming a “nat-
ural fetish,” to quote Sartre  [32] , allowing for emotions to 
circulate.
 Consequently, it is inconceivable for the anorexic per-
son to condone that “refusal to eat” is what characterizes 
his/her trouble, since it is quite the opposite. Food is even 
rather fundamental since it opens, for the anorexic per-
son, the path to others. A therapy based on the epistemol-
ogy of the third-person perspective, which considers that 
what needs to be treated is what obviously stands out (in 
other words refusal to eat), is actually at the antipodes of 
the anorexic person’s subjectivity. We understand why 
Jeanne claims to be traumatized by having been hospital-
ized in a psychiatric environment which did not allow her 
to go back home and see her relatives during the weekend 
if she had not put on enough weight. This therapeutic po-
sition is in contradiction with what the patient  knows 
about her trouble. It reproduces the attitude of Jeanne’s 
family members who are concerned with the  evidence of 
her refusal to eat. Our contribution tends to demonstrate 
that the denial mechanism is not only experienced by the 
anorexic patient and her anosognosia, but also conveys 
the inability of others to perceive her altruism and her in-
tersubjective problematic. 
 The therapeutic proposal of our contribution consists 
in moving the focus to the problematic of unbalanced re-
lationship to others (being too dependent or behaving as 
if the other was dependant on oneself). Placing this rela-
tionship to others in a larger context (a family, group, or 
society perspective), which calls upon adaptive mecha-
nisms inherited from our ancestors through phylogene-
sis, also allows one to step out of a point of view only fo-
cused on the anorexic person (even on the relationship to 
her mother, in certain approaches), with all it can entail 
in terms of shaming or stigmatization. As for the first-
person perspective, it offers the anorexic person the pos-
sibility to appropriate the right to define who she really is, 
to not be subjected to the identity she is saddled with by 
other’s judgement, including the medical one, however 
benevolent the underlying intentions.
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